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The Helms-Burton Act: Force or Folly of
the World's Leader?
Christian Franken
The strong is mightiest alone.
J.C. Friedrich von Schiller,
Wilhelm Tell, Act I, sc. 1 (1804)
Against the assault of laughter nothing can stand.
Mark Twain,
The Mysterious Stranger, (1922).
In response to Cuba's downing of two civilian aircraft regis-
tered in the United States, President Clinton signed the Helms-
Burton Act 1 (hereinafter Libertad) into law on March 12, 1996.
Title III of Libertad creates a cause of action against foreign citi-
zens and companies who currently own, manage, or use proper-
ties that were confiscated by the Cuban government from people
who are now U.S. nationals.2 These foreign citizens and firms
face liability in U.S. courts if they knowingly and intentionally
traffic in property expropriated by the Cuban government with-
out the consent of the U.S. national who previously owned the
property.3 Libertad defines the term "trafficking" very broadly
to include the sale, transfer, brokerage, or possession of any
property to which a U.S. citizen had a claim.4 Furthermore,
Libertad codifies all previous trade restrictions against Cuba
that were in existence as of March 1, 1996, thus making it im-
possible for Presidents alone to modify or repeal existing U.S.
1. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 22 U.S.C.A.
§§ 6021-6091 (West Supp. 1997). This law is also known as the Helms-Burton
Act.
2. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6081-6085.
3. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and
Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 420 (1996); Saturnino E.
Lucio, II, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996:
An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MLAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 325, 328 (1996).
4. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6023(13). See also 22 U.S.C.A. § 6091(b)(2) (defining
"trafficking" for purposes of exclusion of certain aliens).
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policies towards Cuba.5 Libertad thus dramatically widens the
scope of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.
The extraterritorial reach of Libertad is problematic. U.S.
trading partners claim that the Act violates their sovereignty by
exposing their citizens to the extraterritorial application of
American law.6 Critics also assert that Libertad breaches trade
agreements, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 7 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),8 by restricting access to the U.S. domestic market.
The European Union has already requested a World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) hearing on the question of whether Libertad
violates GATT.9 Many commentators believe that the Act en-
dangers the stability of U.S. foreign relations and raises ques-
tions about the consistency of its foreign policy.10
Libertad also has domestic implications. The Act has the
potential to open U.S. courts to a flood of litigation by creating a
new class of plaintiffs, including those originally entitled to re-
lief under the Foreign Claims Settlement Act" and those native
5. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6032(h) (codifying trade restrictions in effect on March
1, 1996), 6064(e) (describing procedure the President must follow to modify
policy).
6. Extraterritorial application of national law is only permitted in a few
well-defined situations. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), found it inconceivable
that an act of Congress would apply outside the territory of the U.S. See gener-
ally BARRY A. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 727-45 (1991)
(discussing evolution of this doctrine). Since 1909, when American Banana was
decided, the United States has moved away from a strict application of this rule
and is much more willing to prosecute outside of its territory. Id. Other na-
tions have found this extraterritorial application of U.S. law to violate their
sovereignty, and even many U.S. commentators, including the drafters of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, believe that extraterritorial application
of domestic law should be limited by an international law rule of reasonable-
ness. Id.
7. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1944, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter
GATT].
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can.,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA.
9. See WTO Secretariat, United States-The Cuban Liberty And Demo-
cratic Solidarity Act: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, WTIDS38/2 (Oct. 8, 1996). See also Guy de Jonquiere & Lionel
Barber, EU puts US "Bully" in the WTO Dock, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996.
10. See, e.g., Wayne S. Smith, Is Hurting Cuba Worth Alienating Friends?
L.A. TIMES, March 2, 1997, at M2; Martin Woollacott, Commentary: The See-
through Reality of Sanctions, GUARDIAN (Manchester), Aug. 31, 1996, at 23; Re-
view & Outlook, This Land Is Their Land, WALL ST. J. EuR., Aug. 25, 1997, at 8.
11. Foreign Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994).
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Cubans who have become Americans since their flight to the
United States.
12
This Note asserts that the Helms-Burton Act violates GATT
and NAFTA. Second, this Note argues that the Act violates gen-
eral principles of international law and illustrates weaknesses
and inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy.
Part I briefly traces the recent history of U.S.-Cuban rela-
tions. Part II discusses Libertad under principles of interna-
tional law. Part III casts doubts on Libertad as a part of U.S.
foreign policy and attacks the Act's validity under GATT and
NAFTA and conventions of international law. Part IV considers
foreign policy issues pertaining to Libertad.
I. THE UNITED STATES, CUBA AND THE WORLD
A. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES-CUBAN RELATIONS
For the past century, the histories of Cuba and the United
States have been intertwined. From the American-Spanish War
until the Castro-led revolution, few countries in the world were
so closely tied to the United States as Cuba.13 Cuba resembled a
federal state, yet lacked the advantages of statehood.' 4 Histori-
ans and contemporary observers alike went so far as to call
Cuba a colony of the U.S.
15
After the American-Spanish War, Cuba gained formal inde-
pendence. However, as Spanish colonial rule ended, Cuba be-
came a U.S. protectorate.' 6 To ensure continued Cuban loyalty,
the United States literally dictated a portion of the new Cuban
12. See, e.g., Lucio, supra note 3, at 328.
13. Besides Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, the Philippines and Guam have
been in an almost colonial relationship with the United States. See, e.g., Efren
Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. Jua. U.P.R. 225, 226 (1996).
14. Id. at 227. Even though formally independent, Cuba's public law was
revised under American supervision and according to American legal princi-
ples. Id. See also JACQUEs-FRANcoIs BONALDI, L'EMPIRE US CONTRE CUBA: Du
M8PRIS AU RESPECT 8 (1982). According to many authors, including Bonaldi,
the United States has not yet come to terms with Cuba's independence, which
accounts for its ongoing preoccupation with its smaller neighbor. Id.
15. BONALDI, supra note 14, at 9. Bonaldi quotes American diplomats as
referring to "our Cuban colony." Id. Another author writes that "if Cuba was
not a colony, it was certainly a subordinate client state." JUAN M. DEL AGUILA,
CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REvOLUTION 55 (1994).
16. DEL AGUILA, supra note 15, at 16.
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Constitution of 1902 by forcing the drafters to include the Platt
Amendment.-
7
While the Platt Amendment was revoked in 1934, and a
new constitution was drafted in 1940,18 Cuba remained depen-
dent on the United States because of their virtually exclusive
trading relationship. 19 A succession of authoritarian regimes
marked the years before Cuba's 1959 revolution. This succes-
sion was interrupted only by a short period of democratically
elected, albeit ineffective, governments. The Batista regime,
which held power from 1952 to 1959, was actively supported by
the United States. 20 When the 1959 revolution deposed Batista
and imposed a communist regime, relations between Cuba and
the United States deteriorated. Following the revolution, Cuba
passed legislation facilitating the expropriation and nationaliza-
tion of property privately held by both foreign and Cuban na-
tionals. 21 By October 1960, Cuba had initiated the confiscation
17. Platt Amendment, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895-98 (1901). The Cuban Consti-
tution that went into effect in 1902 included the Platt Amendment, which (1)
assured that the United States would continue to have access to Cuban ports,
(2) limited Cuba's sovereignty, and (3) permitted the United States to "inter-
vene for the preservation of Cuban independence and for the maintenance of a
government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."
DEL AGUILA, supra note 15, at 18 (quoting FEDERICO G. GIL, LATIN AMERICAN-
UNITED STATES RELATIONS 91 (1971)). The Platt Amendment also barred Cuba
from entering into any treaty that would impair its independence and from as-
suming any public debt absent adequate means of repayment. Platt Amend-
ment, 31 Stat. at 897 (I and II). It also required the Cuban government to sell
or lease to the United States land necessary for establishing naval stations in
Cuba. Id. See also Oscar M. Garibaldi & John D. Kirby, Property Rights in the
Post-Castro Cuban Constitution, 3 U. MimiM Y.B. INT'L L. 225 (1995)
18. See Garibaldi & Kirby, supra note 17, at 229.
19. SUSAN SCHROEDER, CUBA: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL STATISTICS 414
(1982). During the 1950s sugar accounted for more than 80% of Cuba's exports.
Id. The United States bought much of this sugar at 80% above market value,
which meant that the United States was effectively subsidizing most of Cuba's
economy. Richard D. Porotsky, Note, Economic Coercion and the General As-
sembly: a Post-Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-
five-Year-Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 908
(1995). One cannot help drawing parallels between the relationship of the
United States with Cuba before the 1959 revolution and the relationship of the
Soviet Union with Cuba thereafter.
20. See DEL AGUILA, supra note 15, at 16.
21. Jonathan R. Ratchik, Note, Cuban Liberty and the Democratic Solidar-
ity Act of 1995, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 343, 344 (1996). The expropria-
tions were based on "confiscatory decrees" such as the Agrarian Reform Law
(May 17, 1959) (redistributing ownership of land); a law requiring the re-regis-
tration of mineral claims (Law 617, Oct. 27, 1959), imposing a 25% export tax
on minerals which the United States deemed confiscatory; and a petroleum law
imposing a 60% royalty on oil production (Law 635, Nov. 20, 1959). Id. at 345.
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of the last foreign-owned businesses. 22 Most Cuban companies
suffered a similar fate.23 The United States responded with
sanctions that exist to this day.
24
The most important of these sanctions has been a general
embargo, originally implemented by President Kennedy as part
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA).25 In 1962, he ex-
panded the sanctions with an executive order adding Cuban Im-
port Regulations (CIR) to the FAA. 26 However, because of
doubts about the U.S.'s authority to prosecute U.S. citizens act-
ing outside the United States, Kennedy soon amended the CIR,
changing them from being part of the FAA to being part of the
Trading with the Enemy Act.2 7 Under the broad definitions of
the Trading with the Enemy Act, 28 the President enjoyed great
flexibility in adapting policy towards Cuba. One instance of this
discretion is that in spite of the general embargo, Kennedy and
subsequent Presidents created a general license which allowed
subsidiaries of American corporations to trade with Cuba as
long as no U.S. assets or citizens were involved.
29
This situation changed in the mid-seventies when tensions
increased over Cuba's involvement on the African continent.
30
The general license was then abolished and foreign subsidiaries
of American-owned firms that wanted to trade with Cuba were
22. Id. at 347.
23. Many of the Cuban victims of the expropriation decided to flee rather
than to suffer continued harassment from the Castro regime. Due to their busi-
ness ties and the proximity, most of the refugees resettled in the United States.
24. One of the first of these sanctions occurred in 1959. When American oil
refineries located on the island refused to process Soviet oil imports, Cuba
seized the refineries, prompting President Eisenhower to reduce Cuba's sugar
quota from 739,752 tons to 39,752 tons. Id. at 346 n.26. See also Sugar Act of
1948, 61 Stat. 922 (1947) (expired Dec. 31, 1974).
25. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codi-
fied as amended at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). See
also Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157
(1962).
26. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1962). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 420.
27. Cuban Import Regulations: Miscellaneous Amendments, 27 Fed. Reg.
2765 (1962); Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, codified at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1-44 (1994). Initially, the Trading with the Enemy Act had not been impli-
cated because President Kennedy thought that it would be unnecessarily pro-
vocative to do so only a few months after the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Lowenfeld,
supra note 3, at 421 n.18.
28. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 3(a)-(d), 4(a), (b). For example, President Eisen-
hower's lifting of the Cuban sugar quota was done under the Trading With the
Enemy Act.
29. 31 C.F.R. §515.541(1963). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 421.
30. DEL AGUILA, supra note 15, at 126.
1998]
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required to apply for licenses individually. 31 Amendments to
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in 197732 and 198833 fur-
ther refined and restricted relations between U.S. nationals and
Cuba.
34
Until the late 1980s, the alliance of Cuba with the Warsaw
Pact countries provided a clear and, at least from a Western per-
spective, legitimate rationale for U.S. policy. 35 The collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not bring a
correspondingly significant change in relations between the
United States and Cuba. Indeed, U.S. efforts to isolate Cuba
intensified. 3
6
During the early nineties, the Bush Administration shifted
its Cuban policy away from the Cold War aim of containing a
potential Soviet bridgehead at America's door. The new policy
focused on the promotion of democracy, human rights and a
market economy in Cuba.3 7 Congress codified this new policy in
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.38 While promoting the post-
Cold War policies, this statute also narrowed the discretion that
the President previously enjoyed, 39 making the licensing of for-
31. See 31 C.F.R. §515.559 (1975).
32. 42 Fed. Reg. 16,620 (1977). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 421 n.
19. The 1977 amendment somewhat relaxed the restrictions for certain U.S.
visitors to Cuba by permitting individuals to pay for certain goods and services
while in Cuba. DEL AGUILA, supra note 15, at 126. This was in response to a
partial formalization of contacts between the two nations during the Carter
administration.
33. 53 Fed. Reg. 47,526 (1988). See also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 421
n.20. The 1988 amendment prohibited the use of credit cards in connection
with travel to Cuba. Id. at 421. This was one of the Reagan administration's
last actions to increase pressure on the Castro regime.
34. Radio Marti, which broadcast anti-Castro propaganda from the United
States to Cuba, was also established during the Reagan era. DEL AGUILA, supra
note 15, at 136.
35. UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA: PROCEEDINGS IN
THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw IssuEs 163 (Michael Krinsky &
David Golove eds., 1993) (hereinafter Krinsky & Golove). In 1988 "Congress
instructed the administration to prepare appropriate recommendations for im-
proving the enforcement of restrictions on importation of articles from Cuba,"
which resulted in a tightening of the embargo. The Bush administration kept
the Reagan era's hard-line stance against Cuba alive to end Soviet, and then
Russian, support of Cuba. Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 167.
37. Michael Krinsky, U.S. Embargo of Cuba: An Overview. N.Y.L.J., Feb.
20, 1996, at S2. See also Krinsky & Golove, supra note 35, at 136.
38. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994). See also
Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 422.
39. The Cuban Democracy Act suspended the president's discretion to is-
sue licenses. 22 U.S.C. § 6005. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
license may be issued for any transaction described in section 515.559 of title
162 [Vol. 7:157
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eign subsidiaries of U.S. firms impossible. 40 In 1995, Congress
further tightened the embargo on Cuba by passing the Helms-
Burton Act.41 Initially, President Clinton indicated that he
would veto Libertad, based on fears that Titles III and IV of the
Act might be inconsistent with international law, as well as with
U.S. obligations under NAFTA and GATT.42 However, after a
series of Cuban air-to-air missiles downed two airplanes flown
by the Florida-based Cuban-American organization Brothers to
the Rescue43 on February 24, 1996, he signed Libertad into
law.
4 4
Since Libertad passed, the President has twice exercised his
discretion to suspend the effectiveness of Title III of Libertad.
45
Meanwhile, claimants have been lining up outside of law offices
to seek redress under the Act,46 while U.S. trading partners
whose nationals and companies may be threatened by Libertad
are preparing to retaliate.
47
31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on July 1, 1989." 22
U.S.C.§ 6005(a)(1).
40. Id.
41. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091.
42. Leslie M. Norwood, International Banking-U.S. Banks Operating
Abroad, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 173 (1996).
43. Brothers to the Rescue engages in search and rescue missions of refu-
gees adrift in the waters around Cuba. It also actively seeks the overthrow of
the Castro Regime.
44. Bill Tracking Report H.R. 920. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Sol-
idarity (Libertad) Act, H.R. 9399, passed in the House on September 21, 1995,
and an amended version, S. 15325, passed in the Senate on October 10, 1995.
45. The President is authorized to suspend Title III if it is "necessary to the
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democ-
racy in Cuba." 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(b). First, "President Clinton suspended the
practical implications of the Helms-Burton Act until January [1997] to give Un-
dersecretary of Commerce for International Affairs and special envoy to the Eu-
ropean Union, Stuart Eizenstat, the opportunity to convince U.S. allies to join a
new, concerted effort to bring democracy to Cuba." David Fox, EU Widens Re-
taliation to U.S. Trade Measures, Reuter European Community Report, Sept.
15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, REVEC File. On January 2, 1997,
President Clinton suspended for another six month period the portions of
Libertad that would affect foreign nationals and companies. He stated that he
would continue to exercise his privilege to defer the Act as long as U.S. allies
continue to work toward a democratic Cuba. President Clinton Statement on
Helms Burton, U.S. Newswire, Jan. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
USNWR File.
46. See Ann Davis, Helms-Burton's First Test Comes Soon, 18 NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 1, 1996, at A6. See also Mario M. Cuomo, Helms-Burton Bill: A Sound
Solution? U.S. Should End Embargo Against Cuba Immediately, 215 N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 20, 1996, at 56.
47. See Fox, supra note 45. See also European Information Service, EU
Resists US Sanctions, Laws on Cuba, Iran and Libya, European Rep. No. 2154
1998]
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B. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. International Law
In recent decades, the United States has become more will-
ing to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, 48 justifying its actions
under the "effects doctrine." The effects doctrine, one of several
different approaches to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction, is
defined in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.
"Subject to § 403, [which requires reasonableness in the extra-
territorial application of law,] a state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to ... conduct outside its territory
that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory."
49
This trend of extraterritorial application is strongly resisted
by those nations who see U.S. action as a violation of their sover-
eignty. The reasonableness requirement imposed by § 403 of the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law provides a tool to limit
the scope of extraterritorial application of national law. 50 Before
a nation state can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, it must
show an unmistakable link between itself and the activities in
the target state.5 1 Furthermore, even if there is a link, the regu-
lating state should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction if the
other state's interests are clearly greater.
52
A second relevant issue under international law is the con-
tinuous nationality requirement. 53 To successfully claim prop-
erty expropriated by third nations, a claimant must show that
the claim was "continuously owned from the date the claim
arose, and at least to the date of presentation, by nationals of
(1996); Commission of the European Communities, Commission Proposes Euro-
pean Anti-Boycott Law, Press Releases 1P 96-732, July 30, 1996.
48. CARTER & ThImBLE, supra note 6, at 738. Antitrust legislation and se-
curities regulation are clear examples of U.S. laws that have been applied
extraterritorially.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (1987).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403 (1987). See
also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 6, at 738.
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(a) (1987).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(3) (1987).
53. "Where the injury was done to the national of some other State, no
claim to which such injury may give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic
protection which a State is entitled to afford nor can it give rise to a claim which
that State is entitled to espouse." Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, 1939 P.C.I.J.,
(ser. A/B), No. 74, 4, at 16 (Feb. 28, 1939).
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the state asserting the claim."54 "Innumerable international,
domestic and mixed claims arbitral tribunals have followed and
applied [this rulel .,55
2. Trade Agreements
Both GATT and NAFTA provide that, except under a set of
well defined exceptions, member states are enjoined from impos-
ing regulations that interfere with the free flow of goods and
services among GATT members.56 Generally, members of either
agreement are prohibited from engaging in non-tariff restric-
tions on the import or export of goods. 57 A member state may
even challenge measures that do not expressly conflict with
GATT or NAFTA provisions if such measures nullify or impair a
benefit that the party expects under the agreement.58 More
specifically,
if a benefit accruing to [a contracting party] ... is nullified or impaired
... as the result of the application by another contracting party of any
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this agree-
54. Kenneth L. Bachman, et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA,
GATT, 18 NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at C3 (quoting Nationality of Claimant, 8
Whiteman Dig., § 19, at 1241). The continuity requirement is well tested under
U.S. law. See, e.g., Schott v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 268, 24 Iran-U.S.
C.T.R. 203 (1990); Lianosoffv. Gov't of the Islamic Rep. of Iran, Case No. 183, 5
Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 90 (1984). See also Keith Highet, et al., Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-
bunal-Dominant and Effective Nationality Test-Beneficial Ownership of
Claims, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 447, 448 (1993).
Under the long-established rule of international law of continuous na-
tionality, no claimant is entitled to diplomatic protection of the state
whose assistance is invoked unless such claimant was a national of
that state at the time when the claim arose and continuously thereaf-
ter until the claim is presented. In effect, a claim must be a national
claim not only at the time of its presentation, but also at the time when
the injury or loss was sustained.
Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to In-
ternational Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 836 (1982).
55. Leich, supra note 54, at 837.
56. The parties to GATT noted that they were "entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations." GATT, supra note 7, at preamble.
Canada, Mexico and the United States declared that they would "BUILD on
their respective rights and obligations under [GATT]" and "CONTRIBUTE to
the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a cata-
lyst to broader international cooperation." NAFTA, supra note 8, at preamble.
57. "[No prohibitions or restrictions . . . whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted . .. ."
GATT, supra note 7, art. XI, 1. NAFTA contains essentially the same lan-
guage. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 309.
58. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII, I 1(b).
19981
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ment, the contracting party may, with view to the satisfactory adjust-
ment of the matter, make written representations or proposals to the
other contracting party . . . which it considers to be concerned.
5 9
GATT panels have interpreted this language to apply to legisla-
tion that does not directly target a specific nation. For example,
the Panel Report in Australia: Subsidy on Ammonium Sulfate
held that an Australian domestic fertilizer subsidy, enacted dur-
ing World War II, nullified and impaired Chile's GATT benefits,
because Chile produced a similar fertilizer.
60
Valid excuses for non-compliance with the requirements of
the agreements can be found in a number of exemptions.
61 If
the GATT-legality of Libertad were challenged, the U.S. would
most likely rely on the defense of the security exemption.62 In
the event of a national emergency or an outside threat, a mem-
ber state is exempted from taking actions that run counter to its
national security interests. In particular, a member state can
rely on the following language:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any con-
tracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection to its essential security interests taken on in time of war
or other emergency in international relations.
6 3
The United States used this section to justify the embargo it im-
posed on Nicaragua in 1985.64 Nicaragua argued that the secur-
ity exemptions should only be applied in cases of self-defense,
such as when states are subjected to direct aggression. The
Panel examining the issue was unable to examine whether the
United States' use of Article XXI was justified, because its terms
of reference precluded it from even considering any invocation of
Article XI.
65
The GATT member states decided that with respect to Arti-
cle XXI, they "should be cautious not to take any step which
might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement,"
66
59. Id.
60. Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Apr. 3, 1950, GATT
B.I.S.D. (Vol. 2) at 188 (1952); WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT
LAw AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 610 (1994) [hereinafter ANALYTIcAL
INDEX].
61. See the Escape Clauses (GATT, supra note 7, art. XIX), the General
Exceptions Clause (GATT, supra note 7, art. XX) and the Security Exemption
(GATT, supra note 7, Art. XXI).
62. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI, b(iii).
63. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXI. See also NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 2102.
64. World Trade Organization, Panel Report on United States-Trade
Measures Affecting Nicaragua, I/6053 (not adopted) (Oct. 13, 1986).
65. Id. See also ANALYTIcAL INDEX, supra note 60, at 555.
66. ANALYTIcAL INDEX, supra note 60, at 554.
166 [Vol. 7:157
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which implies that good faith is a requisite for Article XXI's in-
vocation.67 This does not, however, preclude a member state af-
fected by an invocation of Article XXI from reserving its non-
violation nullification and impairment rights under Article
XXII.68
3. Policy Considerations
When a nation imposes controversial policies that have an
impact beyond its borders, the effect on foreign relations and for-
eign trade can be chilling. The U.S. embargo on Cuba has never
enjoyed much support from the international community.
69
Even nations otherwise friendly to the United States have com-
plained to the United States about the embargo, and the United
Nations has passed resolutions condemning the embargo.
70
Libertad also effectively creates a secondary boycott7 l which en-
compasses nations not directly involved in the Cuba-United
States conflict.
Libertad creates a potentially large volume of litigation, a
problem that is associated with any new law that introduces a
new cause of action.7 2 If Congress does not introduce legislation
to control the potential flood of lawsuits, large numbers of ac-
tions brought under the new law could bog down the federal
courts.
67. "[Tlhe spirit in which Members of the Organization would interpret
these provisions was the only guarantee against abuses." Id.
68. Argentina reserved its Article XXIII rights when it was subjected to
trade restrictions for non-economic reasons under the guise of Article XXI. Id.
at 560.
69. See Smith, supra note 10, at M2. See also Kees J. Kuilewijk, Export
Law Restrictions Hit Traders, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1996, at 19; Howard Schnei-
der, Canada Knows a Good Deal When It Sees One, and It Sees One in Cuba,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. Oct. 23, 1996, at A15; Krinsky, supra note 37, at S2.
70. In response to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Cuba submitted a
draft resolution to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) condemning
the economic embargo against the nation. The UNGA adopted a revised version
of the draft resolution, 59 votes to three, with 71 abstentions. See Draft Resolu-
tion A/47/L.20/Rev.1, reprinted in Krinsky & Golove, supra note 35.
71. Libertad creates a secondary boycott by applying sanctions not only to
Cuba, the victim of the primary boycott, but also against Cuba's trading part-
ners. When the League of Arab States imposed a boycott on third-party compa-
nies that did business in Israel, the United States strongly condemned the
boycott and passed legislation prohibiting American corporations from comply-
ing with the embargo. The United States went so far as to prosecute a large
American firm that complied with the Arab Boycott Administration's request
for information. Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 430.
72. See Davis, supra note 46, at A6; Cuomo, supra note 46, at 56.
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II. LIBERTAD UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Opinions among international practice attorneys are di-
vided over whether Libertad is legal under international law.
Proponents of the legislation point out that Cuba violated inter-
national law by nationalizing foreign property without just com-
pensation and thus Libertad is a justifiable response and
remedy.73 Libertad's supporters also emphasize that the expro-
priation of Cuban nationals was at odds with basic human
rights such as the right to property, 74 and violated international
law.7 5 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether Libertad will
stand up to challenges from the international community.
A. EFFECTS DOCTRINE
Libertad's drafters defend its extraterritorial reach under
the effects doctrine.7 6 However, they fail to acknowledge that
the reasonableness requirement limits the effects doctrine.7 7
Under the reasonableness requirement, the United States must
not only show that substantial effects resulted from the nearly
40-year old expropriations, but must employ reasonable means
to redress those effects that have accrued to the disadvantage of
U.S. nationals. 7
8
The United States would be hard pressed to convincingly
demonstrate that any territorial effects stemming from Cuba's
expropriations were substantial enough to form a basis for ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. Even if there are substantial effects,
they were not caused by the corporations and individuals that
73. Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with
International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434, 438 (1996).
74. The right to property has been recognized in Article 17 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. U.N.G.A. Res. 217 III, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948). At least one author argues that Libertad is justified as a countermea-
sure to Cuba's violation of this right. Clagett, supra note 73, at 438.
75. See Clagett, supra note 73, at 438.
76. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081 contains an almost literal restatement of the effects
doctrine: "International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide
for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is in-
tended to have substantial effect within its territory." 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081 (refer-
ring to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403 (1987). See
also Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 430-31. While the drafters made the effects
doctrine an integral part of Libertad, references to its "reasonable" application
as interpreted by current international law standards are conspicuously absent.
78. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 431.
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are now liable under Libertad, but were instead caused by the
Cuban government.
79
Furthermore, Libertad could be quite easily interpreted as
unreasonable:
Whether . . . jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating... (a) the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory, or has substantial, direct and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory; ... (c) the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of the regulation to the regulating state, the
extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted; (d) the
existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulations to the interna-
tional political, legal, or economic system.
80
The arguments that Libertad serves domestic political short-
term goals rather than any important legitimate purpose; that
the interests and expectations of U.S. trading partners are dam-
aged incommensurately to any benefits; or that Libertad may in-
deed harm the international political and legal system as a
whole, all suggest Libertad's unreasonableness.
It is highly unlikely that the United States would passively
accept similar legislation targeting its nationals.8 1 A fictional
scenario was raised recently in a debate at the American Society
of International Law.8 2 If France adopted a law exposing Amer-
ican companies that invest in Vietnam to litigation in French
courts, based on the expropriation of French property that oc-
curred when the French left Vietnam in the 1950s, how would
the United States react? The United States would likely reject
the French law with the same vehemence that Libertad has in-
cited in the rest of the world. A Canadian legislative proposal
sought to test this assumption, and thereby expose the absurd
basis for Libertad, by claiming reparations for properties expro-
priated from Tory loyalists during the American Revolution.
8 3
It can be assumed that neither a U.S. President, nor Congress,
nor the American business community would accept a law that
79. On the other hand, the fact that the expropriations caused many
Cubans to flee to the United States could be considered a potentially substan-
tial effect.
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 403(2) (1987).
81. See supra note 70. The United States was not willing to accept the
Arab countries' boycott of Israel.
82. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 432.
83. Canadians Parody Helms-Burton Act: Satiric yet Serious Bill Mocks
the U.S. Anti-Cuba Effort, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct. 23, 1996, at A15.
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so harms the United States as being either reasonable or consis-
tent with international law.
84
B. CONTINUITY
By allowing Cubans who became naturalized U.S. citizens
to bring actions concerning their claims, Libertad may violate
the principle that requires continuity of nationality in interna-
tional claims settlement.8 5 Under the continuity principle, ex-
propriated property must have been owned continuously by a
national of the state asserting the claim, at least until the claim
is presented. 86 While Cuban nationals may have held continu-
ous claims against Cuba, they cannot transfer these claims to
the jurisdiction of the United States simply by becoming U.S.
citizens. At the time when the Cuban nationals' property was
expropriated, they were not U.S. citizens. Therefore, they
should not be able to recover by simply bringing their claim
through the intermediary mechanism of the United States' judi-
cial system. This type of attempt to circumvent the continuity
principle has been challenged in the past.
8 7
However, before the passage of Libertad, Congress stead-
fastly refused to violate the continuity principle out of fear that
a variance from this principle would spur many naturalized
Americans to bring claims against foreign nations. Because
Congress so blatantly ignored this fear, one must ask whether
the Act was passed in haste. Yet, Congress must have antici-
pated how Libertad would reverberate around the world. Care-
less drafting and hasty passage cannot be used to explain the
foreign policy implications of the Act. Perhaps Congress did not
carefully consider the continuous nationality requirement doc-
trine. By overturning the longstanding precedent that only na-
tionals who have continuously held a claim to property
expropriated by a foreign nation may have a cause of action,
Congress opened the door to similar legislation, which could al-
84. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 432.
85. International law deals differently with expropriation of foreigners and
of nationals. The expropriation of foreigners calls for prompt and just compen-
sation. See, e.g. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 6, at 860. Traditionally, the
expropriation of nationals has been seen as a purely domestic issue outside the
scope of international law. In the context of Libertad, it has been argued that
expropriation of nationals should be treated as a human rights violation, which
would bring it within the scope of international law. See, e.g. Clagett, supra
note 73, at 438.
86. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
87. Examples of these challenges can be found in note 54, supra.
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low a flood of actions brought by naturalized U.S. citizens
against countries around the world where property nationaliza-
tion has occurred.
III. LIBERTAD UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
In addition to being vulnerable to challenges under interna-
tional law, Libertad also violates key provisions of NAFTA and
GATT. Indeed, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico have
registered complaints against the United States. The European
Union requested a hearing with the WTO barely six months af-
ter the passage of the Act.88 The United States blocked the
E.U.'s request, but the matter will automatically receive a hear-
ing at the next meeting.8 9 In March 1997, the WTO's director-
general, Renato Ruggiero, assembled a panel to review the Euro-
pean Union claims only weeks before Libertad's first anniver-
sary.90 The establishment of the panel was averted only when
President Clinton, for the second time, exercised his discretion
to delay implementation of Libertad's Titles III and IV.91
Libertad is susceptible to challenge by WTO member coun-
tries and the United States' NAFTA partners because it imposes
burdensome, non-tariff barriers on trade. Article XI of GATT
maintains that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions ... shall be in-
stituted or maintained,"92 thus providing support for challeng-
ing the sanctions against foreign nationals proscribed under
Titles III and IV of Libertad.
A. NULLIFICATION AND IMPAIRMENT PROVISIONS
The nullification and impairment provisions93 of GATT and
NAFTA allow a member state to challenge a measure that does
not expressly violate the terms of the trade agreements. Under
88. See supra note 9.
89. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 15, 1994), art. 6(1) (33 I.L.M. 112, 118)
reprinted in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions: The Legal Texts (1994). "If the complaining party so requests, a panel
shall be established at the latest at the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] meeting
following that at which the request first appears." Id.
90. See Smith, supra note 10.
91. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
92. GATT, supra note 7, art. XI(1) (emphasis added).
93. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII and NAFTA, supra note 8, Annex
2004(1).
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the nullification and impairment provision of GATT, a member
state, whose benefits accruing from provisions of the Agreement
are nullified or impaired through an impediment to trade cre-
ated through the actions by another member state, can have re-
course against that state even if the actions do not facially
violate the Agreement.9 4 One way in which Libertad impairs
benefits expected under the trade agreements is that it exposes
foreign companies to private litigation. As a result, consistency
in enforcement and adjudication will be difficult to predict. For-
eign companies that fear being sued under the Act may cease to
do business with either Cuba or the United States, and thus
forego the profit associated with such trade. As a result,
Libertad introduces an element of difficulty and uncertainty into
trade relations with the United States.
95
If a GATT panel finds nullification and impairment of a ben-
efit accruing under GATT due to Libertad, it can recommend
that the United States disable the damaging legislation. If the
United States chooses not to comply with the recommendation,
the complaining states may seek authorization from the WTO to
suspend the application of obligations to the United States. For
example, in the dispute over the United States boycott of Nica-
ragua, the Panel recommended that the United States volunta-
rily suspend the embargo.96 Had the United States not followed
these recommendations, the Panel would have allowed Nicara-
gua to take countermeasures against the United States.
97
While acknowledging its inability to consider the case under Ar-
ticle XXIII, 98 the Panel recognized that it was unlikely that the
United States would follow the recommendations and that Nica-
ragua was in no position to impose effective countermeasures.
Nullification and impairment under Libertad is different be-
cause even if the United States would decide not to disable the
offending Act, the countermeasures taken by the damaged par-
ties-virtually all of its main trading partners-would be suffi-
cient to reciprocate for lost trade opportunities.
94. See supra note 58.
95. Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA,
GATT, 18 NAT'L L.J. Mar. 11, 1996, at C3.
96. See U.S. Embargo on Nicaragua Did Not Violate Obligations Under
GATT, Dispute Panel Rules, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1368-69 (Nov.
12, 1986).
97. Id.
98. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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B. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
In response to GATT and NAFTA challenges, the United
States will likely claim a security exception. 99 In the past, the
national security exception has been used as a passe partout pro-
vision to justify measures unpopular with other member states.
Although the security exception has yet to be challenged suc-
cessfully, 100 the validity of its use has often been suspect. More-
over, the credibility of the national security exception is further
eroded when it is employed by powerful nations against a small
but uncomfortable neighbor.101
While Cuba was aligned with the Soviet Bloc, the United
States was more apt to defend the use of the security exception
because of Cold War concerns and objectives. However, since
the end of the Cold War, Cuba stands truly isolated and is
hardly a danger to the United States, the predominant power in
the world. It may be argued that in the current climate of ter-
rorist threats and actions against the U.S., and in light of the
downing of an American aircraft, an argument for the national
security exception may make sense. However, Cuba hardly be-
longs to the nations that export terrorism and the U.S. sanctions
against Cuba fail to specifically aim to reduce terrorist threats
emanating from the small island nation. Furthermore, unlike in
the past, the United States will have to defend its invocation of
Article XXI against a majority of GATT member states. Never-
theless, an Article XXI exemption is the most likely way for the
United States to avoid an adverse panel report.
C. THE EXISTENCE OF WTO
The most serious issue involving Libertad and the WTO
Agreement is not Libertad's possible transgression of GATT pro-
visions. Instead, it is the strained relationship between the
United States and other GATT members which results from
99. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
100. Alan S. Lederman, Remarks at the ABA Section of International Law
and Practice Fall Meeting (Oct. 24, 1996). While it may be true that the secur-
ity exception has never been successfully challenged, it has been retracted more
than once, often when the reasons for claiming the exception were so strained
that they would have exposed the claimant state to the ridicule of all other state
parties. See ANALYTicAL INDEX, supra note 53, at 557.
101. It is interesting to note that the United States is quite selective about
which dictators it elects to combat and which it openly supports. The overt sup-
port of Batista, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text, is only one exam-
ple of the support, or at least the tacit acceptance, of regimes that show little
respect for democracy or human rights. See also infra note 109.
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Libertad. Indeed, the dispute over Libertad may threaten the
very existence of the WTO Agreement. Some commentators be-
lieve that Congress and the Clinton Administration underesti-
mated the vigor with which America's WTO partners would
pursue the issue.10 2 By submitting the dispute to a GATT
panel, the parties will not only seek adjudication of their claims,
but also test the very fabric of the Agreement. If the panel finds
that Libertad violates GATT, it will call on the United States to
either repeal Libertad or to modify it to bring it into compliance.
The President has no power over Libertad's content, and it could
be argued that the current Congress would rather cancel the
United State's membership in the World Trade Organization
than repeal or significantly amend the Act. 1 0 3 The very threat of
this scenario has caused some of the adversaries in the Libertad
dispute to relent-as President Clinton has used his only power
under Libertad, (the power to suspend the portions of the Act
every six months),10 4 the Europeans have concurrently ceased
their efforts to bring the issue before a GATT-WTO panel.
IV. POLICY ISSUES
A. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The United States' imposition of Libertad on Cuba's trading
partners creates a classical secondary boycott. This is particu-
larly disturbing, because until now the United States has
strongly condemned secondary boycotts.' 0 5 This is an obvious
inconsistency in U.S. foreign policy.
It comes as no surprise that the United States' trading part-
ners do not take kindly to the exposure of their nationals and
companies to litigation. Within six months of Libertad's enact-
ment, the European Union, Canada, Mexico and other trading
partners of the United States protested the Act. Indeed, these
nations announced countermeasures that will be implemented
once the Act takes effect.' 06 Meanwhile, the European Union,
102. See Smith, supra note 10.
103. Id. The recent failure of Congress to give President Clinton fast-track
authority indicates Congress' stubbornness and fracturedness in trade matters.
See, e.g., Jill Abramson, Labor Victory on Trade Bill Reveals Power, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1997, at Al.
104. See supra note 45.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 47. Canada is set on amending the Foreign Extraterri-
torial Measures Act (FEMA), R.S.C. ch. F-29 (1990) (Can.). As it exists today,
FEMA allows the Candian Government to block the extraterritorial application
of foreign legislation or trading directives that adversly affect Canadian trading
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supported by Japan, ignored the Clinton Administration's assur-
ances that Libertad would not be applied against major U.S.
trading partners and demanded a GATT panel investigation. 107
The European Union backed away from its panel request only
when Clinton suspended the implementation of the Act for an-
other six months. At the very least, Libertad will undermine the
U.S.'s credibility in trade negotiations.
The implications of Libertad, however, go far beyond trade.
While the nations most interested in the outcome of WTO panel
decisions are the U.S.'s major trading partners, most nations
around the world are concerned about American strong-arm pol-
icies.108 Aggressive unilateral U.S. action is especially worri-
some considering that it does not seem to be applied uniformly.
Cuba, a weak nation, is singled out for punishment, while
strong, wealthy nations receive more lenient treatment. At the
very least, Libertad raises questions about the consistency of the
policies of the world's most powerful nation's New World Order.
In order to strengthen its foundation as the world's leader, the
United States ought to go beyond economic and military power
and engage in moral leadership, especially when it claims moral
principles as one of the motivations for its foreign policy. For
example, the United States has highlighted the poor record on
human rights in both Cuba and China when implementing its
policies toward these nations. But while Cuba remains under a
continued embargo, China's Most Favored Nation status has
been renewed every year. 109 The moral principles on which the
interests or infringe on Canadian sovereignty. The proposed amendments will
block the enforcement of any judgments and awards obtained pursuant to
Libertad and establish a "clawback" provision that allows a Canadian individ-
ual or corporation to sue in Canada for recovery of excessive foreign judgments.
Selma M. Lussenburg, Canadian Response to Cuba Embargo, Remarks at the
ABA Section of International Law and Practice Fall Meeting (October 25, 1996).
107. See supra note 9.
108. The most recent addition to the international chorus of rejection is the
Vatican. "Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, the Vatican's foreign minister, de-
nounced Helms-Burton publicly during an official visit to Havana late last
month after a three-hour meeting with Castro." The Vatican has staunchly op-
posed sanctions in any context because they "harm people." Tad Szulc, Castro
and the Pope, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1996, at C7.
109. Even critics of Castro's Cuba, those who are otherwise sympathetic to
the plight of the Cuban people living under an oppressive regime and who are
open to economic sanctions as adequate measures towards the establishment of
a democracy, recognize the fundamental injustice of the Helms-Burton Act.
They cannot help but notice the absence of similar sanctions against China,
which is equally disrespectful of human rights and disinclined to change. Mario
Vargas Llosa, Helms-Burton Law Offers Hope to Cubans, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 1,
1996, at 10. See also Daniel C. Turack, The Clinton Administration's Response
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United States purports to rely should, at the very least, dictate
that like political systems are treated alike.
B. LITIGATION
It is likely that the large number of claims under Libertad
will draw a large number of lawsuits. 110 Even though Cubans
who have become naturalized citizens will not be able to bring
claims before 1998, attorneys have already begun to solicit po-
tential clients.111 This potential flow of litigation not only en-
dangers the recovery of the original U.S. claimants, by diluting
their claims, 112 but also has the potential of paralyzing the fed-
eral courts in the southeastern United States, due to the sheer
volume of suits filed.
V. CONCLUSION
Even if the President of the United States were to indefi-
nitely continue to suspend its effectiveness, the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act is inherently flawed. The aim of
the Helms-Burton Act, to accelerate the end of the Castro Re-
gime, may be a legitimate goal. But the legislation is thoroughly
problematic in more than one respect and should never have
been signed into law, not even in response to the tragic event
that preceded its enactment.
The Act is flawed because it disregards long standing princi-
ples of international law. Even if Cuba's property expropriation
to China's Human Rights Record: At the Halfway Point, 3 TULSA J. COMp. &
INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (1995). It seems that the attribution of MFN or the imposition of
embargoes is more a function of the target nation's wealth than a function of
esoteric values like democracy, human rights, or free trade.
110. Estimates of the number of suits that Cuban immigrants and their de-
scendants may file run as high as 430,000. Davis, supra note 46.
111. Id. Ironically, some of the attorneys who now create corporations as
potential plaintiffs were advisers to the drafters of the Act.
By March 12, the day [Libertad] was signed, Nicolas J. Gutierrez
Jr ... had created 75 Florida corporations as potential plaintiffs so
that even non-U.S. nationals could sue under the act ....
Authors of the law have said it would not trigger a flood of suits.
But the actions of Mr. Gutierrez, an adviser to Congress in the bill's
drafting, [suggests otherwise].
Id.
112. The original field of 6,000 U.S.-based claimants may have been ex-
panded to almost 800,000 naturalized Cubans. See Cuomo, supra note 46, at
S2. At the same time, the value of claims rose from $5 billion to more than $7
billion. Matias Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement
of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INr'L
ECON. L. 659, 663 & n.24 (Summer 1996).
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violated international law, two wrongs don't make a right.
Although Cuba is in America's "backyard," Libertad, the mani-
festation of America's policy toward Cuba, imposes trade penal-
ties on U.S. trading partners around the world. Libertad
impedes free trade, one of the principles it purports to defend.
Ironically, Libertad penalizes U.S. citizens by preventing them
from effectively competing in the world market.
Libertad is not likely to be changed, because its survival
does not depend on continued Presidential goodwill, nor does
Congress appear to be inclined to repeal or amend it in spite of
the many vocal objections to it by U.S. trading partners. Cur-
rently, American citizens and firms are grumbling about how
Libertad puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Unless they
are content to live with this, they will have to object more
strongly to Libertad's unfair and irrational effects. U.S. citizens
and companies will likely become more vociferous once
Libertad's full impact on trade between the United States and
the rest of the world is realized.

